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Religious Addiction
Abstract
It is to my understanding that religion, at its best, is a choice – a choice that manifests
one’s conception of humanity in relation to the sacred. Yet, I intend to discuss religion at its
worst – religion as an addiction, as a meta-determinant of choice. This is to say that religion
harbors the potential to evolve into a subjugating agent akin to drug addiction. To deal in terms
of both religion and addiction, I am tasked with incorporating a diversity of disciplines. It is
tempting to endeavor into this inquiry with a sense of semantic sensationalism, conducting a
cursory assessment of the explicit parallels. Nevertheless, such a method would not do the
inquiry justice, nor does it construct an academically sound theory that can be carried forward
within the broader discipline of Religious Studies. As such, this essay aims to construct a
foundational theory of religious addiction, knitting together a gamut of widely-accepted,
precedence-setting academic theories and processes from across the disciplines of Neurobiology,
Sociology, Psychology, Philosophy and, of course, Religious Studies. The purpose of this essay
is neither to condemn nor diagnose any specific institutions, people groups, or individuals nor is
it inversely meant to venerate any specific religion, political ideology, or ethical position. Rather,
a theory of religious addiction brings with it a sense of introspective freedom in understanding
one’s own self and the opportunity for greater empathy when it comes to conceptualizing the
religious experiences and motivations of those around us.
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Previous Scholarship
The concept of religious addiction is not entirely “breaking news” though the idea does
seem to be sparsely addressed in the medium of scholarly publication. Within the past
seventy-five years, two prominent books on religious addiction attempted to define the topic
outright. Father Leo Booth authored When God Becomes a Drug back in 1946, adapting the
Alcoholics Anonymous’ twelve-step program to track alongside the “dis-ease” of religious
addiction (157-158). He defined religious addiction as “an inability to cope healthily with life”
due to “unhealthy religious beliefs [that] poisoned [one’s] life and left [one] feeling alone,
alienated from family, friends, and, most important, from God” (Booth 50). Following in his
footsteps over sixty years later, Robert N. Minor authored When Religion is an Addiction i n
2007, reviving Booth’s conceptualization as a response to the contemporary rise in the
religio-political right (2, 56). Remarkably, as if to corroborate the popular theory that history is
doomed to repeat itself, both authors seemed preoccupied with a similar subject group:
conservative Christian denominations. Of course, given the difference in socio-political climates,
Booth’s target denomination was a broadly-defined Christian fundamentalism, while Minor
focused primarily on right-wing, “Bible-thumping” evangelicals (Booth 26; Minor 121-122).
Nevertheless, both authors identified specific Christian groups as demonstrative examples of
religious addicts. This is where I begin to unearth some contentions and necessary revisions to
the ongoing scholarship regarding religious addiction.
First, a broad theory of religious addiction is less useful if inapplicable to religion at
large. In this regard, I hold greater frustration with Minor’s approach in particular. Given
Booth’s history in and eventual schism from the Catholic Church, it was reasonable for Booth to
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focus primarily on related forms of fundamentalist Christianity. Additionally, When God is a
Drug directly accepts its status as, at the very least, a monotheist-centric “spiritual-help” book
written to exhort and habitually reform religious addicts directly (Booth 187). On the other hand,
Minor is a Religious Studies professor at the University of Kansas and ought to find it inherently
problematic to conflate the titular “Religion” of When Religion is an Addiction with Western
Christianity. Moreover, he intentionally voids all pretenses of objectivity by siding exclusively
with a positive liberal ethic, writing in his preface that the book was written to teach the
unaddicted left-wing how to effectively handle religious addicts – analogizing evangelical
Christians with the pitiable “druggie” cousin whom the family has to put up with every
Thanksgiving and Christmas (Minor 7-8).
This raises my second point of contention. As I will soon illustrate, addiction is a
neurobiological process. Realization of an addiction is liberating primarily because it recognizes
the neutrality and potency of neurobiological processes and the individual upon which these
processes are acting. A scientific process makes no identity claim on the addict but elucidates a
potential journey towards rehabilitation. Both Booth and Minor attempt some form of
graciousness when speaking to the plight of the religious addict, but neither succeeds in fully
outrunning their underlying, negative, and erroneous perception of addicts as weak-willed or
merely inhibited by their own self-pity. For example, while Minor reasonably asserts that
identifying a friend as an alcoholic “doesn’t condemn the friend or even alcohol itself,” he
incompletely defends this by analyzing the use of the word “wino” (25). He writes, “When
people speak disparagingly of a ‘wino,’ they’re usually not condemning wine. We even know
that many researchers have concluded that drinking a glass of red wine every day may be a
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healthy practice that prevents heart disease” (25). While this explanation exonerates wine, it
provides no such reprieve for the actual target of the slur – the alcoholic. Moreover, in a potently
insensitive remark that displays an ignorance of neurobiological addiction, Minor states,
“Recovery groups confront addicts who don’t take personal responsibility in their particular
circumstance for their particular addictive behavior with: ‘Get off the pity pot’” (24). Booth
mirrors this dismissive view of addiction’s neurobiological effects by referring to the chemical
usurpation of cognitive choice as simply a facade, a “perceived lack of choice” (41). Such
stances perpetuate the harmful and inaccurate conception of addiction as an intrinsically negative
process that maintains its hold simply on account of the addict’s irresponsibility. Thus, neither
Booth nor Minor properly explicates the necessary complexity associated with constructing a
scientifically sound theory of religious addiction, creating the need within Religious Studies to
present a focused theory for how religion can become an addiction.
A Religious Studies Question
The previous publications place religious addiction firmly in the aisle of “healthy
spirituality.” To situate a theory of religious addiction instead in the disciplinary context of
Religious Studies, one must consult psychological critics of religion such as Clyde Kluckhohn,
Darrel Ray, and Sigmund Freud. Each author alludes to addiction in his own explanation of
religion’s significance to the individual. In Myths and Rituals: A General Theory, Kluckhohn
relates religion to a form of constructed escapism. He writes,
In the face of want and death and destruction, all humans have a fundamental insecurity.
To some extent, all culture is a gigantic effort to mask this, to give the future the
simulacrum of safety by making activity repetitive, expective…. Rituals and myths [of
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religions] supply, then, fixed points in a world of bewildering change and disappointment
(Kluckhohn 152, 153).
By providing an alternative reality, religious mythology and rites act as hope-filled coping
mechanisms, fashioned to address an antagonistic world. The creation of deities, epic endeavors,
and iconic ceremonials intends to foster hope – hope that humans can escape the precarious
reality of our own lives, even if only through the appeasement of a higher power or concern.
Mirroring Kluckhohn’s assessment of religion’s significance, substance addiction sets in as
“addicts prefer the pleasure of intoxication, the bliss of oblivion, to the suffering, banality,
ordinariness, and difficulty of mundane day-to-day reality” (Diamond). Escapism permeates the
utilization of religion and addiction alike as each offers a tempting abeyance from the tumult of
life.
A step beyond Kluckhohn, Ray’s assessment of religion in The God Virus draws a much
more explicit relationship between religion and the neurobiological: “Just as surely as
Toxiplasma gondii takes over control of the rat brain, the god virus takes control of the suicide
bomber, priest, preacher or nun and directs behavior to ensure survival or advancement of the
religion” (36). Ray turns religion into a microscopic organism hellbent on parasitic
self-propagation. It is important to address here that addiction is not a cognizant, goal-oriented
entity and neither is religion. As Minor so eloquently puts it, “religion is, frankly, responsible for
nothing” (17). Though imaginative and vivid, Ray’s caustic bias against institutionalized religion
leads to his erroneous presumption that religion wishes to “ensure survival or advancement” for
itself at the cost of the religious constituent (36). Religion has no agency of its own.
Nevertheless, Ray’s description of religion’s cognitive coup d’état very much aligns with the
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scientific development of an addiction which will be covered in subsequent sections on the
neurobiology of religious addiction.
Finally, in Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices, Freud introduces the neurobiological
processes of association and relapse in a religious context. He states, “the ordinary religious
observer carries out a ceremonial without concerning himself with its significance…. In all
believers, however, the motives impelling them to religious practices are unknown” (Freud 200).
Thus, the neurotic compulsion to enact religious rituals is not cogently chosen but has rather
become what Freud names an “obsessive act [that] serves to express unconscious motives and
ideas” (200). With this, Freud is highlighting the crux of patterned addiction: the association
between the ritual practice and the desired results. Thus, obsession surrounding the ritual practice
is not, in actuality, attached to a personal impetus, but rather stems from a compulsive
attachment to the ritual itself – be it the physical movements, the sacred artifacts, or some other
environmental stimuli that had become associated with the ritual’s satiating effects.
Furthermore, Freud pays a passing comment to relapse by analyzing the compulsion
toward religious ritualism through the middle-man of repetitive sin. Freud asserts, “Unredeemed
backslidings into sin are even more common among the pious than among neurotics, and these
give rise to a new form of religious activity; namely penance of which one finds counterparts in
the obsessional neurosis” (201). In this way, the inexorability of sin propels the religious addict
continuously back into ritualized penance. As Booth notes, “shame-based belief” is a symptom
of religious addiction (62). Specifically applicable to a recurring compulsion towards ritualized
penance, Booth argues that “religious addiction, as well as other addictions, is an attempt to
escape this pervasive sense of shame and inadequacy” – the shared goal of guilt-impelled
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penance (62). Martin Luther works as a notable case in which religious addiction compels
ritualized confession and penance out of a sense of utter inadequacy, and Luther’s story will be
explored in more detail in the case studies later on in this essay.
While Kluckhohn, Ray, and Freud each contribute tangentially to a theory of religious
addiction and its position as an inquiry within Religious Studies, none of them provide a
clear-cut framework by which to draw a defined connection to neurobiological processes. To
establish this unambiguous connection, I will turn to Ninian Smart and his theory regarding the
seven dimensions of religion.
The Neurobiology of a Religious Studies Theory
Ninian Smart, like Freud, unknowingly provides insights into the development of
addictive tendencies within the pious population. In his The Religious Experience of Mankind, he
alludes to the potential for the outer aspect of religious ritualism – it’s presentational behavior –
to dominate one’s inner intentions, forming something akin to a process addiction in that the pull
of the ritual subverts conscious choice (Smart “The Religious Experience” 6). At this point,
“ritual then degenerates into a mechanical or conventional process,” and, according to Minor,
such “a process becomes an addiction when a person becomes dependent upon the process for
mood-altering relief from the rest of life” (Smart “The Religious Experience” 6-7; Minor 34).
This dependency is evidence that a neurological event called association has occurred, tying into
tandem Smart’s material dimension – which includes both items and sacred space – with the
dynamic context of religious ritualism (Smart “The World’s Religions” 160-161).
In general, neural associations are created through neuroplasticity events that occur when
a behavior-motivating reward is introduced in the presence of a remembered visual cue – be it
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one’s environment or a material item (Ito et al. 6247-6253; Liu et al. 7-10; Pascoli et al. 463;
Schultz et al. 1597). These associations are more than simply synaptic bridges connecting
abstract regions of the brain. Neuroplasticity events actually alter the structural make-up of one’s
brain cells by increasing the quantitative expression of specific receptors, swapping receptor
subunits to increase efficiency, or redistributing the receptors in a region favorable to elevated,
drug-induced binding of pleasure-creating neurotransmitters like dopamine or serotonin
(Beaudoin et al. 17-21). These changes make it so that the environmental cues themselves can
cause depolarization of dopamine neurons, stimulating a pleasurable response. As such, these
associations can be so strong that a rehabilitated drug addict may relapse if exposed to any visual
cues once associated with past abuse (Ito et al. 6247-6253). Thus, there is the theoretical
potential for the rituals and materials of religion to become addictive, especially when Smart’s
materialistic outer aspect overwhelms the chosen inner aspect of the ritual practice (Smart “The
Religious Experience” 6).
Moreover, religion can and does co-opt the reward pathways often targeted by addictive
substances, utilizing the pleasurable “rewards” of practiced religiosity (i.e. feelings of
acceptance, community, otherworldly euphoria, etc.) to stimulate dopaminergic release.
Religious thought has been shown to increase activity in the bilateral nucleus accumbens as well
as the frontal attentional and ventromedial prefrontal cortical loci – regions of the brain that are
similarly engaged by sexual activity, listening to music, gambling, and drug use (Ferguson
111-114). Particularly interesting, especially taken in conjunction with religion’s usurpation of
behavioral reward pathways, is religion’s role in increasing activity in the prefrontal cortex and
subparietal/temporal lobes – the decision-making and language-processing centers of the brain,
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respectively. This is especially prominent in religious practices that involve ritualized,
disciplined recitation focused on intense control of one’s circumstances such as with Buddhist
meditation or a Catholic nun’s prayers of contrition (Newberg). Given that religious practice
interacts simultaneously with the regions of the brain associated with both addiction and
language-processing, it would make sense to ask if there’s a shared language between the
experience of the drug user and the experience of the pious. Interestingly, there is.
A Shared Language and Experience
Rehabs.com, an American Addiction Centers resource, data-scrapped thousands of drug
user experiences from Erowid Experience Vault and conducted an extensive linguistic analysis,
indexing the most commonly used adjectives, verbs, and nouns for trips involving DMT,
marijuana, cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, LSD, MDMA, and mushrooms. Grouping
together the resulting language, three broad categories emerge – phrases pertaining to euphoria
(bright, rush, magic), fear (addictive, paranoid, panic), and community (friend, home, hug)
(American Addiction Centers). Intriguingly, these are the same impeti that led Dennis Covington
to take up serpents in his book on snake-handling churches, Salvation on Sand Mountain: “Why
had I t aken up serpents? I knew that I had a need to experience ecstatic worship, an addiction to
danger, and a predictable middle-age urge to find out who my people were” (Covington 214).
The motivations and responses to participation in religion and drug use are shared, and these
shared themes will resurface later on in the case studies as each case, at its core, is motivated by
some form of euphoria, fear, or community. Moreover, this shared experiential description
between the addict and the pious is actually ingrained into the physiology of the human body.
The religious experience of the numinous can be felt through magnetic neural stimulation of the

9

previously mentioned subparietal/temporal lobes (Tinoco 249-251). The fact that this
mechanized process can be used to simulate, amplify, and/or supplement the religious experience
proves that the brain has an intrinsic design catered toward the descriptively numinous
experience which can be exploited by religion and drugs alike.
This shared experiential language might very well be the current crux of the relationship
between religion and addiction. As Smart notes, it was the marvelously described religious
experience that beget the great religions of the world – the Buddha and his forty-nine day
meditation on Enlightenment, the Hebrew prophets and their weighty prophecies from YHWH
written in the Tanakh, Mohammad and his transcribed message from the archangel Gabriel that
we call the Qur’an, Arjuna and his theophany in the Bhagavad Gita, and St. Paul’s conversion in
the Christian New Testament book, Acts of the Apostles (“The Religious Experience” 10-11).
There is something compelling in a shared sense of euphoria, fear, and community that draws
people in and compels people to return. Our brain is designed to latch onto these experiences that
both illicit drugs and religious fervor appear to incite. However, it is not enough to simply
identify parallels between religious practice and drug addiction.
In explaining the topic of my research, it became almost expected that whomever I was
talking to would say something like, “I definitely know someone who is addicted to religion.” At
times, I was even asked if one’s uber-religious family member was addicted to religion because
they think gay marriage is an “abomination” (Leviticus 18:22, New Revised Standard Version) .
Now, it is one thing to use shallow similarities to label one’s Gospel-spouting, Trump-voting
grandmother a raging religious addict. Yet, it is an entirely separate issue to say that the two
philosophies, religion and addiction, can actually come together and merge into a singular theory
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that embraces the academic nature behind the sensational labels. After all, similarities between
two vastly divergent disciplines do not necessarily mean that these shared experiences are in
actual dialogue with each other – as would be the case if religion were to evolve into an
addiction.
A Theory of Sociological Transition
To bridge this divide between the sciences and humanities, I will turn to the discipline of
sociology which has often acted as a mediator between these two academic worlds. The first step
must be to employ a sociological theory that can, when appropriate, consolidate the religious
experience with that of addiction. The sociological theory of medicalization does exactly that.
According to Clarke et al.’s Biomedicalization: Technoscience, Health, and Illness in the U.S.,
medicalization is the process of redefining certain areas once considered moral, social or legal as,
instead, medical; thus, making it is an exercise in control over medical phenomena (1). In the
past, substance addiction actually underwent its own medicalization process as well when mental
illness was labeled as deviance and subsequently categorized as either sin, crime, or sickness
over the years (Conrad 6; Conrad & Schneider 31-34). This secondary categorization has
developed into a vying, socio-political conflict over which social institution – religion, the penal
system, or the healthcare network – has both the power and responsibility to realign the deviant
individual (Conrad & Schneider 31-34). Given this context, religion has been historically
understood as a social agent that grapples for power. However, it seems possible to apply the
theory of medicalization to religion itself, proposing that the social agent be viewed instead as an
object to be analyzed as a functioning religious addiction.
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To fit this typology, religious addiction must adhere to the “doctrine of specific etiology”
in which, as both disease and deviance, it must have a single, specific, external, identifiable, and
medically treatable origin (Conrad & Schneider 33). For the first two, religion is singular for the
individual’s conception of it, and it is specific within the confines of this conception. Addressing
the third, obviously religion is external – though it comes to be weighty through its interaction
with the internal. Regarding the fourth, this essay is tasked precisely with identifying religion as
a potentially addictive substance. Finally, there is the issue of “medically treatable” which, at
first glance and discounting the use of psychotropic drugs, seems to be the obvious occluder of
religious addiction from being an object of medicalization. However, according to Conrad in his
The Medicalization of Society, medicalization and medical treatment need not go hand-in-hand
as treatment fluctuates with societal support while medicalization is an independent, canonizing,
semantical process (6-7, 124-126, 132). As such, supposing religious addiction underwent
medicalization, the public’s tolerance of such symptoms would allow for medical treatment to
lag in addressing the issue, which is probably for the best. After all, supposing “treatment” came
in the form of psychotropic prescriptions, which is quite common nowadays, it would still bring
into question the informed independence of any subsequent choices made by the individual
regarding religion (Conrad 128-129). Even still, the theory of medicalization demonstrates that
religion, a social factor, can not only evolve into a scientific or medical experience, but it ought
to in order to explain some of the religious phenomena we see today such as feelings of being
trapped within a religion or even religiously inspired violence.
A secondary step in religious addiction’s sociological development is to acknowledge
how society's treatment of the religious experience has led to a harmful social-blindness to
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religious addiction. In “How Race Becomes Biology: Embodiment of Social Inequality”
Clarence Gravlee outlines social embodiment theory in terms of race. By his theory, society has
expected a racial difference in health and normalized subconscious preferential treatment of
specific communities by race so much so that racism has become ingrained into the literal
biology of broad ethnic communities (48). Essentially, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy that has
led to race becoming biology. In a similar way, normalization of religious fervor and subsequent
dismissal due to media sensationalization has led to the propagation and continuation of harmful
religious addiction. When atypical religiosity is dismissed as merely “religious fanaticism,” we
overlook a potential case of religious addiction, encouraging ignorance and propagating future
cases in which the practitioners aren’t even aware of how the religion may be affecting their
neurobiological decision-making. Religious addiction is only recognized through individual
introspection – the active contemplation of one’s internal decision-making process. By
dismissing cases as simply religious zealotry, we dismiss opportunities for dialogue and critical,
introspective thought. We fail to provide a potential source of freedom. These individual
moments, these opportunities for introspection, are important because religious addiction is an
individual process.
The Individualization of Religious Addiction
The evolution of religious addiction is on a case-by-case basis and isn’t necessarily a
general populace phenomenon. As religion has become individualized, so has religious
addiction. The process of religion’s individualization can be found in Linda Mercadante’s Belief
without Borders. Mercandante tracks the proliferation of the “spiritual but not religious”
(SBNRs) category, which finds its roots in the Westernized veneration of autonomy that was, in
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turn, birthed out of the uniformity of the 1950s. Following this Judeo-Protestant Golden Age,
societal opinion began an across-the-board regression away from institutionalized religion,
associating religious practice with antiquated “values that constrained individual freedom and
expression” (Mercadante 25). By as early as the 1970s, parenting patterns had, ironically,
conformed to the American values of nonconformity and individuality. It had become the
politically-correct norm to deplore a well-intentioned imposition of one’s religious beliefs upon
one’s children (Mercadante 47). Thus, it has become more and more common, with each
successive generation, for individuals to be less and less indoctrinated into the religio-ritualic
traditions of their past. The results of such autonomy are covered in Catherine Bell’s lecture at
Santa Clara University: Who Owns Tradition? According to Bell, “Practitioners are likely to
downplay doctrinal matters and emphasize imagery that is personally compelling…. The
emphasis on one’s own world of experience and what sustains it is most important” (Bell 5). In
this regard, there are as many practiced religions as there are practitioners, and cases of religious
addiction depend entirely upon how any single, specific practitioner has, by their own unique
experiences, cultivated a relationship with their individually conceptualized religion. It is
inaccurate to blanket-label any denomination, sect, or branch of a religion as intrinsically more
addictive than the next. The development of religious addiction is practitioner dependent. As
such, the best analysis of applicability for a theory of religious addiction is through the use of
case studies.
Case Studies
The following case studies conform to one or more of the aforementioned themes found
in the shared vocabulary between religious experiences and that of illicit drug use: euphoria, fear,
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or community. In practice, they are best encapsulated by Dennis Covington’s assertion: “I knew
that I had a need to experience ecstatic worship (euphoria), an addiction to danger (fear), and a
predictable middle-age urge to find out who my people were (community)” (Covington 214).
Within these themes, each individual experiences some prototypical symptom of drug addiction
but in relation to their own religious journeys.
Case Study: Martin Luther
Martin Luther is one of the most well-known Christian figures since the Biblical era. He
was also an obsessive confessionary. This does not mean that he simply told everyone his faults.
It’s that he could not go a single day without spending hours in a confessional, seeking
absolution. He was overwhelmed by his sinfulness and the fear that God would reject him
(Heck). In fact, Daniel Judd’s “Clinical and Pastoral Implications of the Ministry of Martin
Luther and the Protestant Reformation” explicitly relates Luther’s mannerisms to an addiction.
Luther embodied one of Booth’s primary “Symptoms of Religious Addiction”: “Shame-based
belief that you aren’t good enough, or you aren’t ‘doing it right’” (59). In fact, Luther
demonstrated another symptom of addiction: physical deterioration. Luther’s “heavy doses of
confession caused physical pain and suffering” and he “developed digestive difficulties (e.g.,
kidney and gallstones) due to the anxiety caused by his battling sin” (Heck). Nevertheless, this
all changed when Luther was directed to acknowledge and confront his addictive behaviors. The
leader of Luther’s monastery, Johan Staupitz, encouraged Luther to read the Bible directly,
fixating on passages like Romans 7 where redemption comes through a change of heart and
God’s grace, not by any meritocratic forms of ritualistic penance (Heck). When Luther accepted
this alternative perspective on salvation, his association with the ritual of confession was
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interrupted and he was freed to choose a philosophy of grace. Luther subverted his need to live a
certain way in order to obtain the mentally and emotionally satiating reward of spiritual peace.
Luther’s case study highlights an important and permeating factor of religious addiction: the
breaking of the addictive, religiously motivated behavior need not result in a fallback on atheism.
As Smart notes, there is a separation between the external practice and the internal belief (Smart
“The Religious Experience” 6). For religious ex-addicts like Luther, the reward pathways once
associated with the self-destructive, external practices, were instead redrawn to the healthy,
internal, and chosen sentiments and motivations behind the rituals. In this sense, the ritual itself
no longer stimulated a satiating dopaminergic release. This hints at another nuance to religious
addiction: it is not always negative as demonstrated in the following case study.
Case Study: Menachem Magidor
Menachem Magidor was a secular, Jewish mathematician who served as President of The
Hebrew University of Jerusalem from 1997 until 2009, and during his tenure as President, he
wrote “The Temple Mount—A Personal Account.” This account was later published in Where
Heaven and Earth Meet: Jerusalem’s Sacred Esplanade. In the short excerpt, Magidor
passionately recounts paradoxical feelings of euphoria related to the Temple Mount that seems
to come in direct conflict with his chosen religious identity. Atop the Temple Mount, Magidor
limned that “in spite of [his] atheistic attitude, [he] could not resist sharing [in] the ecstasy and
reverence” of his Jewish ancestors, noting a mental connection between this visceral reaction and
his actualized presence at the holy site (Magidor 364). Magidor was associating the Temple
Mount with the neurological rewards of religious and communal nostalgia, which explains his
unexplainable and illogical reaction. Like with narcotics such as cocaine, heroin, or

16

methamphetamine, nostalgia, such as that attached to religious history, stimulates and prolongs
dopamine release (Childers). Raised in a Jewish and Israeli home, Magidor inherited such an
aforementioned, religious nostalgia for a culturally perceived golden age of piety embodied by
the environment of the Temple Mount. More than that, the grown Magidor associates this
communal nostalgia with his own childhood nostalgia, exacerbating the overwhelming feeling he
writes about in his account. This case study illustrates that the neurobiological influences of
religious addiction, as previously stated, need not be negative and, rather intriguingly, may exist
regardless of how one chooses to religiously identity.
Case Study: Baruch Goldstein
Magidor’s case was an exception. In most instances where choice is dictated by a
religion, that religion is intimately important and spiritually true to the individual. One such
instance can be seen, rather violently, with Dr. Baruch Goldstein. In 1994, Goldstein, an
upstanding physician in his Jewish community, entered the Mosque of Ibrahim and
systematically massacred twenty-nine Muslim men and young boys as they knelt in prayer. In
the aftermath, Goldstein was simultaneously hailed as a Davidic hero and, conversely, labeled an
insane extremist. Yet, by utilizing a theory of religious addiction, I aim to propose that he was
going through a form of withdrawal, as violent tendencies are a prototypical symptom of
detoxification.
Religion is not a pill, it is not a powder, it is not tangible. It is a concept. Removal of the
“drug,” in the case of religion, happens with degradation of the venerated, environmental cues.
The neural associations of religious addiction can be broken not just through spatial distance, but
conceptually. Goldstein feared that the Jews in Hebron, along with their space of worship, were
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under conceptually vilifying attack by their Muslim neighbors and neglected by their governing
bodies. His holy, his sacred, had been adulterated and removed, and in his fear and desperation,
he lashed out in violence, clawing for his sacred satiation to be restored. In the end, he was
bludgeoned to death by the survivors of the shooting.
Case Study: The LGBTQ Religious Community
This next case study is quite a bit broader than the previous, though it shares with
Magidor’s account a driving theme of community. In the United States, as with most developed
countries, suicide is the only non-disease related, top-ten cause of death, and, when it comes to
the Christian Church, suicide rates are markedly, tree times higher in the LGBTQ religious
community (Kuruvilla; “Suicide”). As it turns out, a non-heterosexual individual is not only
more prone to depression and suicidal ideation if he or she attends church, but practicing religion
actually correlates with increased suicide attempts across his or her entire lifetime (Lytle et al.).
Thus arises the obvious question: Why is it that, contrary to leading tendencies, religiosity has
come to detrimentally elevate the suicide rate for LGBTQ individuals? The answer reads like a
fix.
An understanding of religious truth is often community- determined. It is why one’s
ummah is so important to Muslims and why Protestant Christians segregate into denominations
(Hermansen 28). And when your community rejects something core to your identity, claiming it
as an unquestionable truth of your religion, it simply creates a dangerous, desperate desire to
reattain a fix of the sacred. Beckett Jones, a young, gay, transgender Mormon stated, “[Mormon]
youth are told that everything gets fixed in Heaven. That when they’re going through a rough
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period of faith and crisis, they think that it will fix the problem. That it’s their way out”
(Kuruvilla). Compelled to reattain that sacred satiation, violence turns inward.
Case Study: Myanmar Buddhists in Sri Lanka
In addition to violent tendencies, addiction is typically accompanied by a misperceived
sense of victimhood – a form of fear. Minor writes, “When Religion is an Addiction isn’t written
for those who fit its description of religious addicts…. I expect it will make them angry, more
defensive, and even more reliant on claims that addicts make about how they are the real victims
of everyone else” (8). Essentially, they villainize those who seek to disrupt the addictive
relationship they have developed with their drug (i.e. their own religion). This is powerfully
demonstrated by Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu’s defense of terrorist acts committed by
Buddhists in Myanmar against their Muslim neighbors. Wirathu argued that the religiously
motivated violence of the Burmese Buddhists was morally justifiable as self-defense. He
asserted, “We have to protect our people” (Juergensmeyer 129). When pressed on how the 4%
Muslim minority population in Myanmar could possibly threaten the Buddhist majority, Wirathu
argued that Muslim extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS were “trying to transform
Myanmar into a Muslim state” through intermarriage, “secretive” mosque meetings behind
locked doors, and an evident desire by Islamic extremists to rule the world (Juergensmeyer 130).
As his interviewer, Mark Juergensmeyer, noted in Terror in the Mind of God, there were no
active Islamic extremist groups located in Myanmar, ethnic intermarriage was an incredibly
infrequent occurrence, and the doors of the mosque were locked simply to avoid non-Muslims
entering with their shoes on, desecrating the sacred space (130). Nevertheless, this did not
assuage Wirathu’s fears as he claimed that “most [Muslims] were under [Islamic extremist]

19

influence, so virtually all Muslims in Myanmar were suspect” (Juergensmeyer 130). Religiously
aligned paranoia commanded an irrational villainization of multiculturalism. To these Burmese
Buddhist terrorists, the environmental cues they associated with Myanmar’s Buddhist roots were
under Muslim attack, and they had to fight to maintain access to their drug of choice: geocentric
religion.
Case Study: Dennis Covington
On a lighter note than the previous three case studies, Dennis Covington’s
autobiographical story, Salvation on Sand Mountain, shares the characteristics of conceptual
disassociation as seen with Martin Luther and even with Dr. Baruch Goldstein. However,
Covington’s experience goes one step further, exhibiting how socialization, or community, apart
from an addiction is the proven, best way to preemptively mitigate relapse or withdrawal
behaviors. Covington began his foray into Religious Studies as a journalist following the trial of
Glenn Summerford. Summerford was charged with attempted murder after coercing his wife to
take up snakes at The Church of Jesus with Signs Following in Scottsboro, Alabama. Naturally,
Covington followed the story’s roots to this snake-handling church. This is what Covington had
to say following his first trip to the church: “I drove back to Birmingham that night in a
heightened and confused state, as though the pupils of my spiritual eyes had been dilated. The
sensation was uncomfortable but not entirely unpleasant. Whatever this was about, I wanted to
experience more” (Covington 11). He tracked this infatuation to a sense of fate, stating, “I
believe that my religious education had pointed me all along toward some ultimate rendezvous
with people who took up serpents” (Covington 11). Yet, over the course of a single sermon,
Covington’s infatuation abruptly came to an end. Brother Carl, a fellow congregant at the
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church, followed a jovial wedding ceremony with a terribly misogynistic, impassioned tirade
against the achievement-seeking independence of modern, liberal women (Covington 226-228).
Covington’s neural association of the snake-handlers with the satiating rewards of religious
community was broken by Carl’s sexist sermon. However, he did not mirror Carl’s verbally
abrasive attack.
Covington did not result to violent tendencies. Instead, he looked to his wife Vicki,
finding a sense of community and accord in her as well as their camerawoman, Melissa, who was
assigned alongside Covington to cover the story at the snake-handling church. Covington,
himself, then proceeded to give a sermon from Mark 16, advocating for a woman’s right to
preach the gospel of Jesus Christ right alongside men. When giving the sermon, though he
received derogatory responses from Carl and other male attendees, Carl’s wife Carolyn gave
Covington an “Amen,” and with this response he wrote, “I knew I was in the Word now. It was
close to the feeling I’d had when I’d handled” (232). Covington did not pick a fight with Carl nor
did he verbally abuse Carl for his antiquated view on a woman’s role. Covington did not exhibit
any of the typical signs of withdrawal because had instead found a new community o f women t o
replace the neural rewards he had been receiving through the snake-handling men. According to
Rana El Rawas and Alois Saria, “social interaction [or community] , if offered alternatively
outside the drug context, may have pronounced protective effects against drug abuse and
relapse” (492). The negative effects of ending religious addiction can be avoided by utilizing
other outlets for one’s euphoria, fear, or community. Martin Luther found an alternative euphoria
in God’s grace, and Covington found his alternative in a community of strong women.
Closing Remarks
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I believe, apart from the taking of a life, the single greatest injustice is the deceptive
subversion and manipulation of one’s liberty that manifests in addiction. People feel helpless and
blame themselves for a perceived lack of self-control when addicted. They question whether
something is wrong with them. Their identity is destabilized by their inability to choose. It is
made all the worse when the addiction is to a religion – where addiction-induced
self-condemnation can not only lead to a dysfunctional lifestyle but actually alter one’s
relationship with the sacred, potentially incurring mortal consequences. I think and hope that this
essay and my future research into religious addiction will create a novel, theoretical
understanding of religious terrorism that neither villainizes the individual nor the religion.
Furthermore, I hope that it will bring a hopeful outlook to those who feel trapped within a
destructive religion and don’t understand why they can’t escape. I want to reestablish religion as
a beautiful choice, rather than a domineering burden.
Future Directions
While non-invasive instruments such as MRIs have allowed for visualization of
religion-stimulated neural activity, difficulties arise when it comes to experimentally verifying
whether or not religion does, in fact, cause a topographic change in one’s neurons similar to that
induced by illicit substances. Such a distinct, cocaine-induced neural change has been verified in
mouse models, but these verification techniques are highly invasive and present ethical dilemmas
when it comes to human trials. As such, while scholastic theory, neural activity, a shared
vocabulary, and case study behavior all seem to indicate that religious addiction is a recognizable
aspect of the religious experience, future research must seek interdisciplinary partnerships to
develop methods for more quantitative analyses. Additionally, further inquiry into the
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philosophical implications of religious addiction on personhood would be incredibly
enlightening as religious addiction’s cognitive usurpation of individual choice calls into question
conceptions of the Lockean self. In the end, as with any effective foundational theory, a theory of
religious addiction raises more questions to be explored and more knowledge to be applied.
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Research Narrative for “Religious Addiction”
The research process for my Capstone project entitled “Religious Addiction” was rather
unorthodox. Unlike my fellow peers, I came into our Capstone course having already decided
upon a research topic and with an extensive bibliography of sources. In fact, the only additional
research I conducted after entering the class included googling “religious addiction,” sifting
through the paucity of available publications on the topic, purchasing, and reading Fr. Leo
Booth’s When God Becomes a Drug and Dr. Robert Minor’s When Religion is an Addiction. The
ease of this process was facilitated by my curiosity in religious addiction beginning my
Sophomore year.
In the Fall of 2017, Religion 3457 (Jerusalem) combined my experience in Dr.
Beaudoin’s Neurobiology Lab with anecdotal evidence of potential, religiously influenced
addictive behaviors. I ended up writing a blog and continuing my interests in religious addiction
throughout my subsequent semesters at Trinity. By the time I began my Capstone essay, I had
acquired nearly all of my cited sources simply through the completion of various reading
assignments across a gamut of classes. I pulled sociological essays and psychological
word-studies from Sociology 2339 (Health, Illness, and Society), religio-ethical case studies and
religious studies theories from Religion 1320 (Ethical Issues and the Religious Perspective) and
Religion 2400 (What is Religion?), and neurotheological articles from my time studying cocaine
addiction and neurobiology in Biology 3190 (Independent Study in Biology – Neurobiology
Research). Nevertheless, as an aspiring university professor, I believe this is exactly what

research should look like – utilizing one’s creativity to organically synthesize the underlying
themes of one’s personal and variegated experiences into a narrative story of academic interest.

